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     ABSTRACT   
 
 This thesis examines the concept of the state in the context of the Indus River Valley, located in 
northwest India and Pakistan. In the first section, I synthesize several popular trends in state discussion 
from both inside and outside of archaeological theory.  I then apply my synthesized approach to state 
definition to the archaeological record from the Indus River Valley. The resulting work visits both the 
concept of the state and the rich cultural history of the Indus Civilization. I determine that there was a state 
in the Indus River Valley, but that the Indus state was very different from others scholars have identified in 
the archaeological record. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Overview 
The Keepers of the Roaring Water… 
 Thousands of years ago, the peoples of the Indian subcontinent began writing 
down their sacred hymns.   These sacred hymns, known as Vedas, were spiritual parables, 
stories that taught their audiences lessons about the nature of the cosmos.  These texts not 
only form the foundation of one of the largest and most ancient religions in the world, 
they are also the earliest decipherable records of India’s rich cultural history.  
 But the Vedas also allude to a much more ancient era in India’s past, an era for 
which historical records can say little, an era for which we have only remnants of 
shattered texts, written in a language as mysterious to contemporary scholars as the 
civilization that produced it.  The oldest of the Vedas, the Rig-Veda, appears generations 
after this ancient civilization collapsed.  Within its hymns are references to an empire of 
fortresses that stood sentinel over the mighty rivers of ancient India.  The following is an 
excerpt from a popular translation of the Rig-Veda that references this mysterious, 
ancient civilization.  
 
I let forth the roaring water; the gods followed after my wish.  Ecstatic with 
Soma, I shattered the nine and ninety fortresses of the Sambara all at once, 
finishing off the inhabitant as the hundredth, as I gave aid to Divodasa 
Atithigva…. [Doniger 1981:129] 
 
 This text illustrates a lingering cultural memory of an ancient people that once 
inhabited Northwest India (Wheeler 1968).  To the writers of the Rig-Veda, this once 
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great civilization was little more than hulking ruins quietly guarding the Indus and 
Saraswati rivers.  History can tell us little more about who these people were and what 
they were like.  In order to address the mysteries of this once magnificent civilization, we 
must turn to other sources of information. 
This thesis addresses whether the Indus Civilization, which shares many of the 
same socioeconomic advantages with the other pristine civilizations, but lacks the 
defining characteristics of social control that define statehood in social theory, can be 
considered a state.  Was there a state in the Indus River Valley?  If so, why was it able to 
avoid the nastier aspects of social complexity while reaping the benefits of statehood?  
What made the Indus Civilization an exception to the apparent laws of socioeconomic 
evolution? 
 
Defining the Indus Civilization in Space and Time 
 Within the Punjab and Sindh regions of Northwest India and Pakistan, ruins litter 
the floodplains around the Indus River.  The civilization that produced these ruins has 
been given many titles by archaeologists and other scholars.  The most popular title is the 
“Harappan” civilization, so named after the first of the sites to receive significant 
attention from archaeologists.  The earliest archaeologists to work in the region believed 
that Harappa was the capital of the civilization.   
Not long after work began in Harappa, another, larger site called Mohenjo Daro, 
“Mound of the Dead” in the local language, was discovered.  This led some 
archaeologists and other scholars to refer to the sites collectively as the “Indus” 
civilization, identifying the predominant geographic region that encompasses both sites.   
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Figure I: Map of major geographical features and sites discussed in the text.  Modified from 
Kalayanaraman 2006, Kenoyer 1998: 27,Possehl 2002:41, http://maps.google.com 
 
As of the turn of the twenty-first century, the number of surveyed sites along the course 
of the now-dry Saraswati River has increased dramatically, leading some scholars to 
identify the sites as the “Indus-Saraswati River System Civilization.” 
 I will not be referring to the subject of this work as the “Harappan” civilization, as 
the implication that the cultural group discussed is centralized culturally, politically, or 
economically within the city of Harappa is false.  Nor will I refer to the “Indus-Saraswati 
River System Civilization” either, even though it is the most accurate label for the subject 
of this project.  It is too awkward, and as of yet, no sites have been unearthed along the 
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ancient Saraswati that justify such a title.  If and when more archaeological work is done 
along the Saraswati, it is possible that the true “capital” of the civilization will be 
unearthed.  Then a change in terms may be necessary.  I will use the term “Indus 
Civilization” to discuss its subject.  It retains an appropriate level of accuracy in 
pinpointing the ancient cultural complex without becoming cumbersome.   
 The Indus Civilization was located within one of the most fertile floodplains in 
the world.  Thousands of years ago, the Indus and Saraswati rivers flowed from the 
foothills of the Himalaya Mountains with much velocity.  They cut through what is now 
Northern Pakistan, picking up fresh, fertile soils from the rich mountain foothills and 
depositing them within their floodplains when they reached the lower, flatter regions 
approaching the coastline.  A rich layer of riverine silt developed around the slower 
sections of the rivers’ courses.  Combined with the warm, temperate climate bestowed 
upon the region by currents flowing from the Arabian Sea and the rain-shield formed by 
the Himalaya Mountains, these river floodplains were positioned most fortuitously.  
Climate and geography converged to form the most productive breadbasket in northern 
India.  These fertile floodplains were the perfect draw for the budding agriculturalists of 
Northwest India and Pakistan.  
The Indus and Saraswati were mountain rivers; their output varied from year to 
year with the various tectonic and glacial processes that shaped and reshaped the 
Himalayas.  Today, the very processes that gave life to these rivers have all but taken it 
from the Saraswati, and drastically altered the course of the Indus.  Tectonic activity 
stripped the Saraswati from its source springs, reducing it to a trickle  (McIntosh 2002).   
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Despite the difficulty tectonic activity added to predicting the rivers’ flood cycles, 
the ancient Indus and Saraswati formed the backbone of an agricultural society that grew 
into the Indus Civilization.  After generations in the region, Indus farmers developed the 
techniques necessary to cope with the floods’ irregularities (McIntosh 2002). 
The Indus people made extensive use of the lands within and surrounding the 
floodplains.  Archaeological sites extend all along the length of the ancient Saraswati 
River’s course and follow the trail of the Indus all the way to the coastline.  The Arabian 
Sea forms the civilization’s southernmost boundary.  The remains of ancient forts have 
been found to the far northwest, within the grassy foothills of Baluchistan, a region 
named for the tribes that have historically farmed and foraged there.  To the northeast, 
sites extend all the way to the Himalaya Mountains.  All in all, the Indus Civilization 
controlled a region that was larger than any of the civilizations of ancient Mesopotamia 
or Egypt (Kenoyer 1998; McIntosh 2002). 
It is clear from the archaeological record that the people of the Indus were, during 
the height of their ancient civilization, expert farmers and fishermen.  They were masters 
of prediction, maintaining a tenuous relationship with the cyclic floods from the rivers 
that gave their cities life (McIntosh 2002).  Their expert planning paid off in the form of a 
manageable subsistence base that lasted their civilization thousands of years.  They 
produced vast amounts of food.  The Indus farmers’ efforts made possible the growth of a 
population in the tens of thousands.  The surplus food allowed for the development of a 
plethora of specialists that included bead-makers, potters, lapidaries, metalworkers, 
flintknappers, and many, many other specialized professionals.  Generations of artisans, 
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given economic viability by the hard-working farmers of the Indus and Saraswati 
floodplains, lived their lives in comfort within the high walls of their monumental cities. 
Before they began building cities, they were master foragers and pastoralists.  The 
peoples of the Indus valley developed a number of domesticates, including cattle, goats, 
and many other fauna.  Indeed, even as the city limits of Harappa and Mohenjo Daro 
grew, entire societies of nomads traveled in between the cities of the Indus, trading goods 
and allowing for economic development (Kenoyer 1998). 
The peoples of the Indus Civilization were technologically advanced.  The 
specialists of Harappa were masters of metallurgy.  They produced a great number of 
copper and gold ornaments; bangles and bracelets adorned the well to do of the city’s 
citizenry.  They were also masters of lapidary and carving.  Tiny, steatite beads have been 
found in many ancient Indus households.  (Mackay 1935) 
The Indus Civilization had a system of writing that took the form of complex 
steatite and clay seals.  Each tiny square was impressed or inscribed with a pictogram 
surrounded by a number of etchings or other symbols.  These intricate symbols were used 
to seal pots and mark walls.  Some were arranged into long lines of script that adorned 
city entrances and other architecture.  Scholars have not yet been able to translate the 
ancient Indus script. 
A number of intricate clay spheres and cubes have been recovered from cultural 
deposits in the Indus valley.  These artifacts form what many scholars believe to be a 
uniform system of weights and measures.  Judging from food and artifact remains 
archaeologists have uncovered, the Indus Civilization not only possessed the ability to 
produce vast amounts of food and trade goods, they were able to record amounts of food 
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and goods they had produced.  Such economic development in a civilization from this era 
is most impressive. 
Indus cities were paragons of planning and organization.  Neighborhoods were 
proportioned very similar to one another, with wide walkways and uniform construction.  
Homes were built with complete gutter-drainage systems that led to street-level facets for 
runoff collection (Mackay 1935).  Without this multifarious system for dealing with rain 
and runoff, the dense, mud-brick structures would have melted away in a heavy rain.  
Modern city-planners could take a lesson from these ancient masters of architecture. 
Scholars often describe the peoples of the Indus Civilization as religious (Kenoyer 
1998, Mackay 1935, McIntosh 2002).  A common icon found on many of the seals 
recovered from Harappa and Mohenjo Daro is that of a thin, seated figured with many 
arms.  Some scholars suggest that this icon represents Shiva, one of the central gods in 
the Hindu pantheon (Mackay 1935).  This motif is repeated on pots and on buildings.  
The Indus Civilization built what some scholars believe was a public bath in one of their 
largest cities (Possehl 2002).  This may have been used for ritual bathing, a social 
institution associated with the modern Caste system in India (McIntosh 2002). 
The Indus Civilization was the first large-scale socio-political entity in or around 
the Indian subcontinent.  The earliest phase of the Indus Era, called Mehrgarh, began as 
early as 6500 BC.  The civilization reached its height around 2600 BC, when Harappa 
expanded to what would be its greatest size. 
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Solving the Mysteries of the Indus 
 The Indus Civilization left an archaeological footprint that is different from all of 
the other independently established, or pristine, civilizations.  The states that came to 
dominate the other five pristine civilizations, Egypt, South American, Mesoamerica, 
Mesopotamia, and China, all left behind archaeological records that are choked with 
violence and oppression.  Extreme sociopolitical differentiation characterizes these 
ancient states.  Hundreds were sacrificed upon the death of the elites in some of these 
civilizations.  The rich were very rich, and the poor were very poor.  Some lived long, 
healthy lives, and some ambled through their lives with undernourished, pathology-
ridden skeletons.  Traditions of warfare and violent expansion are themes that repeat over 
and over in the archaeological remains of these civilizations. 
 Relative to the cultural remains of other ancient civilizations, the Indus 
Civilization is devoid of similar forms of violence and inequality.  This is not to say that 
the archaeological assemblage from the Indus Civilization is without violence or 
inequality, but rather when compared to other assemblages, evidence for these 
phenomena is hardly significant.  Violence and inequality are difficult to identify within 
Indus cultural remains. 
 This is problematic because the Indus Civilization developed in many ways 
parallel to the other pristine civilizations.  The peoples of the Indus floodplains had most 
if not all of the technologies that the other pristine civilizations enjoyed.  They built cities 
that were larger, more crowed, and more energy-expensive than most of the other pristine 
civilizations could manage.  Their civilization expanded across a region as far and wide 
as that of the other pristine civilizations.  The Indus Civilization pursued the same 
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riverine subsistence strategy as many of the other pristine civilizations, facing the same 
environmental and demographic pressures.  They had to time their plantings and manage 
the flow of country goods into and out of their cities just as did the other civilizations.  
Yet, the Indus Civilization seems to have dodged the pitfalls associated with statehood in 
the other pristine civilizations.  The Indus peoples lived their lives relatively free of 
oppression or extreme inequality.  Warfare, in the sense of organized campaigns and 
territorial expansion, is completely absent, and violence appears to have occurred rarely if 
at all (Cork 2005). 
 
Chapter 2: The State 
Manifesting the State 
 In order to address whether or not there was a state in the Indus River Valley, we 
must identify and define the concept of the state independently from the research 
question.  Social scientists have utilized the concept for generations. Sometimes, the state 
is used as a convenient term for identifying governmental process.  The works of the 
early Greek philosophers discuss the powers of the state in this way.  Sometimes, such as 
in the work of Foucault or Bourdieu, the state is enveloped in other concepts such as 
power and ideology.  In other cases, the state is the final stage of a cultural evolution that 
proceeds in neat order from the simplest bands to the most complex empires.   
If the state is to serve as an identifiable concept, an independent definition that is 
not contingent on the data from the Indus Civilization must be established.  Once this is 
accomplished, the definition can be applied to the specific case of the Indus River Valley, 
and the question of whether or not there was a state in region can be properly addressed. 
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Social scholars often assume that the audience already shares their impression of 
what the state is and how it works, rendering specific definition and discussion of the 
concept unnecessary.  This is the primary reason the state is used so variably in social 
theory.  Because modern scholars are identifying the socio-political entity they live in, 
they neglect specific definition of that socio-political entity. 
 How then, should we approach the task of defining the state?  In this chapter, I 
will address the importance of the state as a socio-political entity.  Next, the implications 
of any research on the state will be identified, and the strongest methodology for defining 
the state will be established. 
 The state is the most pervasive form of socio-political organization humanity has 
ever seen.  Every person living today is subject to the sovereignty of one of the world’s 
many states.  They have been around for only a short time in the grand scheme of 
humanity’s past, but they wasted no time in expanding all across the globe.  They 
comprise one of the most powerful forces for evolution of culture, and are largely 
responsible for the worldview held by the people that inhabit them.  This is the most 
important reason for studying the state. 
 Scholars interested in understanding the state must understand the context from 
which their research takes place.  Modern academia is, itself, one of the many facets of 
the modern state; if the modern world were not organized into states, modern academia 
would not exist.  Without modern academia, this project would not exist.  Of course this 
affects the outlook this project will impose upon its subject.  This project is a construction 
of the very institution it seeks to study. 
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 It is impossible to achieve an objective perspective when discussing cultural 
phenomena.  This means that scientific approaches are of limited use to modern social 
theory.  When humans research themselves or something they created, they become both 
the observers and the observed.  They use the culture they wish to learn about to interpret 
the world around them.  This project acknowledges this boundary in academic discourse.  
All research projects bring with them a certain set of biases and assumptions that pre-
shape their conclusions before data are ever even analyzed.  This dilemma has plagued 
social science since its inception. 
 Luckily, social theorists are a creative bunch, and a handful of post-modern 
thinkers borrowed a concept called “the critical hermeneutic” from the textual sciences.  
Basically, the critical hermeneutic reminds the researcher that she is as much a subject of 
her research as the “text” she is studying (Roby 2005).  Every reader brings his or her 
own impressions to any set of information.  It follows that every reader is affected by the 
text they are studying, as their own biases and impressions are changed or unchanged 
depending on the content of the subject research.  The researcher must, therefore, analyze 
herself and her impressions of the data set just as thoroughly as the text she is studying.   
This may appear complicated, but it is really quite simple.  This project studies 
the state from the context of modern academia, a facet of the state.  It is, therefore, 
examining the very socio-political factors that created it.  By defining the state, it defines 
itself.  The conclusions this project makes about the Indus Civilization have direct 
meaning and importance to the project itself because they are contributing to the 
knowledge of the system that created it.  The problem of objectivity is embraced because 
both the observer and the observed are shaped by the research.  All facets of the project, 
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the data set and the analyzer, are subject to interpretation.  In a sense, everyone and 
everything involved in the development of a research project is a subject. 
 Identifying the presence or absence of a state within the Indus River Valley 
enhances our understanding of the state within contemporary society.  Once the state is 
defined via social theory, its application to the Indus River Valley will illustrate one of 
two things.  It may show that the region was not home to the rise and fall of a state, that 
the method of socio-political organization used by the peoples of the Indus Civilization 
was fundamentally different from that used by people today.  Conversely, it may 
illustrate that the region was home to a state, fundamentally similar to contemporary 
forms of socio-political organization.  In that case, this project would serve as a testament 
to the potential flexibility inherent to the state.  Either way, thanks to the application of 
the critical hermeneutic, this project advances both the knowledge of the state and the 
knowledge of the Indus Civilization. 
 This project must acknowledge its bias towards of applicability.  Models of the 
state tend to be tailored towards the project for which they were developed.  Many of 
these models fail when they are applied in comparative work across disciplines.  Indeed, 
many of these models are impossible to apply to any data set outside of their parent 
discipline.  This makes the use of extra-disciplinary knowledge of some fields of social 
science inaccessible for use in some case studies.  Highly idiosyncratic data are difficult 
to subject to comparative analysis.   
This work focuses upon an archaeological assemblage.  Therefore, the state 
definition that will ultimately be applied to the Indus Civilization must function within 
the discipline of archaeology.  However, this project will build its definition from 
13 
 
 
knowledge bases both within and beyond the discipline of archaeology.  Its definition 
will be useful in arenas beyond archaeology.  The project will establish a synthetic 
conception of the state, one that is applicable both within and outside of archaeology.  In 
doing so, I overcome the bias of applicability.  The collective effort of many different 
facets of social inquiry will be used.   This project seeks to look beyond insular, 
conventional understandings of the state and apply a broader discussion of the concept to 
the Indus Civilization specifically. 
 
Discussions of the State in Social Science 
 The study of the state is as old as the socio-political institution itself.  As humans 
began materializing their thoughts and opinions in writing, one of the most important 
topics was the role of the state. Early works were concerned with the bounds of 
governmental power.  Plato’s Republic is one of the earliest accounts of the state.  In this 
work, he addresses topics that range from authority and power to demographics and 
trade.  The desire to understand the world he lives in drives him to analyze the socio-
political entity he finds himself a part of, just as the goal of gaining a greater 
understanding of the state motivates this project’s research. 
 Social theory today, though grounded in the work of ancient thinkers all over the 
world, owes its current basis to scholars working during the great cultural mix-ups of the 
past five hundred years.  Colonialism brought about the birth of the first generation of 
dedicated social scientists.  The Industrial Revolution brought about the second wave of 
founding figures in social theory.  The rapid change brought about by the rise of 
capitalism and the foundation of modern globalization inspired scholars to tackle 
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complex socio-cultural issues, such as the definition of the state.  It is within this context 
that first explicit discussion of the state begins. 
 The disciplines of anthropology and sociology begin the process of defining the 
state, along with many other social and cultural phenomena, in earnest during the mid-
nineteenth century.  To summarize the origins of the debate succinctly, anthropologists 
looked outward towards other cultures in an attempt to find universals and understand 
cultural change.  Many anthropologists, such as Franz Boas, were disheartened by the 
encroachment of industrialism on indigenous cultures.  To them, every culture was a text, 
to be recorded and preserved before it disappeared (McGee and Warms 2004). 
Sociologists looked inwards to processes taking place within their own societies.  
Subjugated and oppressed segments of society become the subjects of intense study.  
Many early sociologists, such as Karl Marx, became so enraged by the plight of the poor 
and alienated classes that they actively urged other social scientists to become voices for 
the down and out.   
Of course, not all sociologists were as moved by the plight of the working class as 
Marx.  Some apologist scholars, such as Herbert Spencer, wrote that form society had 
taken was natural.  Spencer is famous for a work in which he compares the modern state 
to a human organism.  Inspired by the work of Charles Darwin, Spencer argues that 
segments of society are naturally selected to be poor workers and that some are selected 
to become the thinking elite.   
Both disciplines sought to understand the same socio-culture changes humanity is 
subject to. There was a great deal of crossover between the fields.  The inward focus of 
sociology led to more specific discussion of the state among its scholars.  Anthropologists 
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largely contrasted studies of smaller socio-political entities to the Western behemoth.  
Still, when examining the founding theoretical texts behind both disciplines, one 
encounters the names of the same theorists over and over.  A social theorist was a social 
theorist, no matter his or her specific discipline. 
Social evolution is one of the most important trends in social theory.  It was based 
in the principle of natural selection and change described by Darwin-era biologists.  The 
basic tenant of social evolution is that societies evolve in much the same way as 
biological animals. As a society grows in population and in technological achievement, it 
becomes more complex.  Human societies begin their existence as bands. As they grow 
and become more complex they change into tribes, chiefdoms, and eventually states.  
Most social evolutionists would agree on that much. 
The exact nature of social evolution - that is, the mechanisms behind social 
change and the cultural specifics resulting from that change - is a matter of contention.  
The earliest evolutionists believed that all humans are on one universal track from 
primitive to civilized.  The state was the epitome of this progressive journey.  Others 
believed that the end point for any given society depends on environmental factors.  The 
earliest discussion of the state took place within this context. What factors caused a 
precursor society to change into a state?  Even after satisfactorily answering that 
question, the more challenging one remains:  What exactly is a state? 
While few modern social theorists would describe themselves as evolutionists, it 
would be difficult for most to deny the influence social evolution has had on social 
theory.  It was the dominant paradigm in pre-positivist thought, and its essence remained 
in social theory for many years.  The reason for this is quite simple.  Evolution is all 
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about change, and it is an undeniable fact that culture changes.  Archaeology is especially 
aware of cultural change.  Due to the anatomy of archaeological deposits, changing 
cultures are often crystal clear beneath the many stratigraphic layers in a site. 
The idea of cultural change in its rawest form, revolution, became the founding 
tenant for one of the most important trends in social theory today.  Like the other social 
evolutionists of his time, Karl Marx found himself swept up in the scientific fervor the 
Enlightenment inspired in the nineteenth-century European intelligentsia.  Struck by the 
plight of the working class within the changing world of the industrial revolution, Marx 
collaborated with another intellectual named Frederick Engels to produce an evolutionary 
work that shocked the other social theorists of his day.  Where other scholars, such as 
Spencer, had used social theory to identify and reinforce the dominant power structure, 
Marx and Engels capitalized on the same body of theory to expose and undermine that 
structure.   
They assigned a great deal of importance to conflict between the classes.  In the 
pivotal synthesis of their work, The Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels (1848) 
claimed that societies were dynamic changing entities whose cultural specifics were 
determined by society’s material needs.  They focused on the class relationships that 
define the socio-political entities.  Their primary concern was to describe and elucidate 
how their society functioned.  Because Marx and Engels lived in a state society, an 
understanding of how classical Marxism works is crucial to understanding how the 
concept of the state has evolved over time. 
In Classical Marxism, one factor trumps all others in determining how a given 
society will appear culturally and economically.  That factor is what Marxists call the 
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mode of production.  The mode of production is the basal relationship a society has with 
its environment.  It is comprised of the means of production, the technologies and 
materials that allow a society to produce what it needs to survive, and the relationships of 
production, or the way each class interacts with the mode of production.  The mode of 
production provides the foundation of support for the rest of society, or the super-
structure.  Change comes from the mode of production, and reverberates upwards into the 
rest of society. 
Classical Marxism claims that all societies throughout history have been plagued 
by the unequal distribution of wealth.  Societies are comprised by classes, groups of 
people that are defined by their access to the means of production.  The ruling class 
controls the means of production.  The means of production are exactly what they sound 
like: materials such as land, tools, and raw resources that allow a society to pursue its 
mode of production.  Classes are in a constant struggle with one another, each striving for 
better access to the means of production.  Social change occurs only through competition 
between social classes.  Revolution occurs when one class seizes control over the means 
of production. 
In their example, the myriad states of Industrial Europe, the mode of production 
was capitalism.  Capitalism was the economic system succeeding Feudalism.  To Marx, 
Capitalism was a disease, destroying the planet in its relentless hunger for raw materials. 
In this case, the means of production consisted of the factories and other productive 
facilities that made capitalism possible.  The root conflict was between the owners of the 
means of production, the ruling class or bourgeoisie, and the workers who used the means 
of production to produce wealth, the proletariat.  It is in the best interests of the ruling 
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class to take as much from the proletariat as possible so long as the proletariat can still 
get by.  It is in the best interests of the proletariat to rise up and seize control of the means 
of production for themselves.  Therein lies the class conflict Marx and Engels (1848) so 
passionately described.  One day, the proletariat would rise up and seize control of the 
means of production themselves, and alter the mode of production forever.  The 
Communist Manifesto  (1848) was a call to arms for the working class.  In Classical 
Marxism, the only way for society to change was through revolution, and if a revolution 
failed to occur soon, capitalism would destroy the world.  In a very real sense, Marx and 
Engels were the very first praxis anthropologists. 
One last note about Classical Marxism: the bourgeoisie were an infinitely crafty 
bunch.  Elites, in Classical Marxism, use their control of the means of production to 
impose their ideology on the rest of society.  Ideology consists of beliefs, religion, and 
philosophies held by members of society.  The dominant ideology in any given society 
was handed down to the working class by their capitalist oppressors, and was used to 
keep people in line.  Social change still came from changes in the basal, productive levels 
of social structure, but ideology was everywhere, stabilizing the social system and 
preventing workers from becoming aware of their class interests.  Ideology was, 
however, nothing but a reactionary band-aid that guarded against the threat workers’ 
awareness could have for the status quo. 
Engels (1942) published a book specifically on how he imagined the state coming 
into being.  To Engels, the state was the mechanism by which the ruling elite kept 
workers in line.  It existed to allow such institutions as the army to develop and maintain 
the social hierarchy the ruling class needed to survive.  The state was an ephemeral, pre-
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established concept.  His work was more an attempt to explain why the state exists than 
to define what the state is. 
Marxism was a force in social theory for quite some time.  However, with 
historical events come academic consequences, and Marxism fell out of favor with the 
West’s ivory towers for almost half a century.  Luckily, with the post-modern critique of 
the late twentieth century, social theorists turned their back on positivist approaches and 
looked towards Marxism for new inspiration.  The emphasis Marxism placed on social 
activism and political importance brought it back into favor with social theorists, and a 
whole new wave of Marxist thinking was set to begin.  With this new wave came an 
entirely new and much more useful way to think about the state. 
From a dank prison cell within an Italian penitentiary, Antonio Gramsci wrote a 
diary that redefined how many social theorists conceptualized power and the state.  He 
was a fan of Classical Marxism, but two hundred years had passed, and there had been no 
workers’ revolution.  There had, however, been a great deal of socio-political change.  
This led him to refine many of the concepts Classical Marxism had established.  If 
society had changed, and there had been no workers revolution, something else must 
driving social change.  Gramsci is responsible, in large part, for the evolution of Marxism 
into Neo-Marxism, Karl and Frederick’s theoretical grandchild. 
In Neo-Marxism, there are other factors at work besides revolution.  
Contemporary society is best understood in terms of ideology (Gramsci 2002).  Marxism 
remains theoretically sound, but in order to explain many of the changes that take place in 
society, Classical Marxism has to be flipped on its head.  In the “Prison Notebooks,” 
Gramsci describes the power the ruling class has in controlling and manipulating 
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ideology.  Specifically, the ruling class can control the process of enculturation. By 
changing what ideology is taught to children in schools, the ruling class can create an 
obedient and servile working class.  Power relationships present in schools favor a top-
down hierarchy in which students are judged and controlled by a group of “elites,” 
teachers and other professionals.  Because the ruling class enjoys hegemonic control over 
the minds of these students, they have complete control over academic enculturation.  
The curriculum reinforces this method of control.  Students are taught concrete notions 
about the world.  They are given conclusions without first being introduced to problems.  
This deprives them of the capacity to arrive at these conclusions themselves.  Left 
without ways to think, students revert back to what they have been taught in a faulty, 
concrete sense.  Teachers reproduce the dominant culture in the minds of the students via 
their socio-political position (Gramsci, 2002). 
Thereby, Neo-Marxism assigns the ruling class a much more active part in 
controlling and maintaining ideology.  The ruling class can do more than create a 
defensive ideology that justifies their reign; they can actually increase their power by 
actively manipulating the way people think.  Neo-Marxism attributes much more 
importance and power to ideology and yields to the ruling classes a much more sinister 
position of power.  They have the power to directly influence the minds of the people 
whom they exploit. 
In his revision of Marxism, Gramsci introduces a much deeper role for the state.    
The state, according to Neo-Marxism, is a vehicle for defending hegemony, or the 
complete cultural domination of the minds of its subjects (Alonso 1994).  This allows 
centrally controlled socio-political entities to colonize lands, forming territories that can 
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eventually transform into nations.  The transformation of land into territory and 
inhabitants into citizens results from the active efforts of agents in the ruling class.  
Ideology is a facet of this transformation.  The state is the tool by which the ruling class 
transforms its ideology and transfers it down into the rest of society. 
Gorlier (2002) reminds contemporary readers that Neo-Marxism too is an 
expression of Western socio-political and economic theory.  As such, it is subject to the 
control of the ruling class.  Sometimes, class interest can create enough consciousness to 
drive holes into the complete hegemony the ruling class often enjoys. The discourse 
between these facets of class interest and the ruling ideology is important to keep in 
mind.  Neo-Marxism is a force in academia, and is, itself, a facet of the dominant 
ideology.  Therefore, it should be used in a self-acknowledging, self-critical, and 
confrontational manner. 
Neo-Marxism is concerned with ephemeral cultural concepts such as ideology and 
discourse.  These concepts are often difficult to detect archaeologically.  Luckily, they do 
affect the creation of material culture in ways that can leave an archaeological trail. This 
project must make a special effort to transfer the principles of statehood from Neo-
Marxism into a form that is useful for examining archaeological remains. 
While Gramsci was compiling Neo-Marxism, other social theorists focused 
strictly on societal super-structures such as power and ideology in social theory.  Many 
post-modernists isolated specific concepts found in many social paradigms.  They then 
began to discuss these concepts separate from the paradigms that had established them.  
Power and social change are two important examples of this process.   
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Power is the manifestation of the ability to coerce others into enacting one’s will.  
Power comes from control over something of great importance within society.  Often, 
power comes from the control of ideology.  Thus, ideology is the mechanism by which 
power is reproduced and strengthened.  The state is the protector of ideology.  The 
interaction between power, ideology, and the encroachment of social change fascinated 
many scholars, and was the primary impetus behind the works of scholars such as 
Bourdieu. 
Boudieu (1977) asserts that there need to be working models for the upkeep of 
ideology.  Like Marx, Gramsci, Engels, and Spencer, Bourdieu believed that there was an 
underlying structure that made society appear the way it does.  However, Bourdieu clung 
to the idea that the ruling class could only maintain so much control over ideology.  
Individuals belonged to many different groups and each of those groups maintained its 
own set of beliefs about the world and how it worked.  Thus, in Bourdieu’s work, change 
could and often did come from ideology, but the agents of change need not always be the 
ruling class.  He creates another set of analytical tools for dissecting and understanding 
society, some of which are useful for understanding why the state may express itself one 
way in one instance, and another way in another instance. (Bourdieu 1977) 
To Bourdieu, there are systems of classification that structure ideology.   People 
belong to many different social fields.  Examples of these fields include femininity, 
government, leadership, or adolescence.  These fields are organized via a defined 
hierarchy (Moi 1991).  This hierarchy is determined by the status of the individuals who 
comprise various fields.  Within these fields, members compete for social capital in hopes 
of attaining legitimacy.  Social legitimacy allows an individual more control over the 
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discourse occurring within a field.  Changes in one field may affect others only if that 
field is sufficiently high in the society hierarchy.  A field’s power is determined by the 
social status of the people it consists of. 
Each field contains a set of rules.  These rules are unique to one field, and are 
irrelevant to other fields.  They are determined by the nature of the field in which they 
occur.  All of the members of a given field take part in the establishment and 
maintenance of those rules.  The sum total of these rules is called habitus (Moi 1991). 
Individuals act as agents within their fields.  Agents establish and maintain the 
structure of the fields they compete in.  Each field has an agenda.  Each has its own set of 
goals.  The individual or group within a field that has the most social capital, and thus, 
legitimacy within their field, sets forth that field’s agenda and leads it towards completing 
that agenda. 
The deepest, most intrinsic structure in Bourdieu’s society is called the doxa.  As 
society changes, heterodoxy challenges the unspoken but omnipresent structure of 
society.  When an element of the doxa comes under attack from heterodoxy, it becomes 
orthodoxy, a source of conservative defense.  Often, orthodoxy exaggerates whatever 
aspect of doxa it originated from. 
One must have social legitimacy in a field to actively create heterodoxy.  
Therefore, competition occurs not only at a macro, or class-dominant level.  It occurs on 
every tier of society.  The ruling class has an interest in maintaining the doxa, as the doxa 
allows the status quo to persist.  Challenges to the doxa often arise through the work of a 
variety of agents.  Crises weaken the doxa, and are often the impetus behind new forms 
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of heterodoxy.  The state, according to the Bourdieu, is the institutionalized defense of 
the doxa and competition within society. 
Bourdieu isolates structures that dictate the way society functions.  His goal, 
according to critics, is to combine the objective and the subjective, thus eliminating the 
fallacy of positivism while continuing to allow for cross-societal comparison and 
analysis.  Because he separates habitus from the social fields it structures, habitus 
becomes a quantifiable, independent entity, free of human biases (King 2000).  
Unfortunately, any objectivity-based analysis has serious problems, as discussed 
previously in this work.  This does not render Bourdieu’s tools of analysis unusable.  
Rather, it necessitates the critical and sparing use of Bourdieu’s theory, applying it only 
where it is most informative. 
 
Summary of the State in Social Science 
 The proceeding explanations of various trends in social theory are not exhaustive.  
Rather, the proceeding section summarized only a handful of the most useful analytical 
tools social science has to offer this project.  The state was rarely discussed specifically 
by any of the above authors, however it is a critical component of each of their analyses. 
 Social evolution provided the first definition of the state.  Unfortunately, the state 
is only intrinsically defined in social evolution.  It is the end result of evolutionary 
processes.  While this explains little about what the state is or how it can be recognized 
archaeologically, it does provide a basis for one of the leading paradigms for state 
discussion: Marxism. 
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 Marxism makes many important contributions to the discussion of the state.  The 
base of any state is its mode of production.  The interactions between the productive 
forces and the ideology, which is the vehicle by which the ruling class governs the lower 
classes, determine the actual character of the state.   
Gramsci adds that power is the ability for the ruling class to directly impose its 
will upon the masses.  Power is exercised through ideology; the ruling class controls the 
worldview of the masses through enculturation.  The elite use ideology to mold the lower 
classes into whatever is needed to maintain the status quo.  States, in this context, are the 
vehicles by which ideology is maintained.  In order to determine whether or not a state is 
present in any give society, one must determine whether or not ideological control is 
present in a given society.  If no ideological control is present then the presence of a state 
is doubtful.  This control need not be universal.  There is room for competition between 
certain factions within society. 
 
The State in Archaeology 
 Archaeological theory paralleled the development of social theory as a whole.  
Evolution had the same impact in archaeological theory as it did social in theory.  After 
all, archaeology is in the best position among the social sciences to observe change over 
time.  Because change is easy to view over time, evolution is an almost natural 
conclusion when faced with data from the archaeological record.  As such, the state was 
framed in the context of development. 
 Most archaeological work undertaken in the mid-twentieth century utilized 
the positivist interpretive approaches of New Archaeology to come up with analyses.  
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This sort of theorizing was very processual and deterministic.  Humans had concrete 
interactions with their environments, and those interactions led to the transitional 
behaviors that gave socio-political entities such as the state life. 
One of the most pervasive trends in archaeological theory from this era was the 
idea of evolution.  Evolution was and is an important aspect of any discussion of socio-
politics within archaeology.  Societies change from generation to generation, and the state 
had to in some ways be the result of changes in societies that predated it. 
 Elman Service (1958) made one of the earliest attempts at directly defining the 
state in archaeology.  Service was a four-field anthropologist.  His writings reflected 
more than just archaeological fieldwork.  Service was an ethnographer and believed he 
could discern patterns in past cultures by categorizing them with information garnered 
from living populations.  He describes four steps on an evolutionary ladder that a society 
progresses through as it develops from very primitive to very complex.  All peoples begin 
organized via band-level societies.  Band societies are small, hunter-gatherer groups with 
simple customs.  They leave behind little material culture to be found by archaeologists.  
As band societies grow, they fission into multiple bands, which aggregate to form tribes.  
Tribes may consist of multiple bands that meet ever so often.  They may also be 
comprised of many sedentary villages that are linked socio-politically.  Regardless, tribes 
evolve into chiefdoms when one sedentary village comes to dominate the others in an 
area.  Chiefdoms have centralized leadership and powerful ruling elites.  When multiple 
chiefdoms expand, primitive states develop.  States are characterized by immense 
populations and ruling classes.  Warfare, oppression, and a whole suite of modern-day 
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problems are associated with this conception of the state.  States are characterized by a 
much more rigid hierarchy than chiefdoms (Covey 2003). 
 Service’s initial description of the primitive state became near-dogma in 
archaeology.  Even though the concept was defined so superficially, Service’s works 
were often used as textbooks in archaeology.  Archaeologists who later discussed the 
state in their work often overlooked the task of defining the state as they planned to use 
the concept, falling back on Service’s initial work.  The result is a corpus of 
archaeological literature that tends to avoid directly discussing what the state is.  Rather, 
archaeologists prefer writing about the state’s origins and making binary determinations 
of whether or not the state exists in a particular assemblage. 
 Another approach that archaeologists use when defining the state is functionalism.  
The state arises due to the needs of society.  For example, the theory of circumscription 
claims that the state arises from the need for defense and warfare (Carneiro 1970).  A 
growing chiefdom that begins facing its competitors with violence and expansion tends to 
be centralized in a location that is circumscribed by defensive geography. 
 Some theories that archaeologists have proposed claim that the state is a response 
to the organizational vacuum that develops atop a populous chiefdom’s super-structure.  
For example, in some treatments of the archaeological state, the state arises as a society’s 
mode of production demands more organized group labor (Stanish 2001).  Still, the state 
itself goes undefined.  The state often serves to centralize control for an expanding sphere 
of territory (Spencer and Raymond 2004).  Rather than defining the concept of the state 
specifically, archaeologists merely identify what the state does. 
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 In the proceeding examples, the power vacuum left by certain socio-economic 
developments is a deterministic entity.  The fortuitously located circumscription state is 
determined by its location. Unfortunately, determinism is a flawed concept in social 
theory because it oversimplifies cultural development.  For example, under an 
environmental deterministic paradigm, all societies that arose in the desert would develop 
into identical or very similar entities.  The determinism characterized by circumscription 
theory is environmental; it does not provide an explanation for populous chiefdoms 
located in circumscribed environments that did not develop into states.  This problem 
leads Roscoe (1993) to write that archaeology is failing to keep up with the other cultural 
sciences when it comes to the application of ideology and hegemony to social change.  
This project attempts to overcome determinism, thus offering a more dynamic conception 
of the state. 
 Agency-based definitions of the state are also popular in modern archaeological 
interpretation.  According to agency-based definitions of the state, societies utilize a 
certain set of leveling strategies to maintain their egalitarian characteristics.  Elites must 
brush aside these leveling strategies in order to reproduce their power, allowing a 
permanent upper class to develop (Covey 2003).  Some claim that there will always be 
individuals in any society grabbing for the socio-political advantage (Blanton et al 1996).  
This political corpus of archaeological theory comprises a very important part of this 
project’s definition of the state. 
 The discussion of the state in archaeology here is far from exhaustive, and only a 
few important trends in state discussion have been integrated into this research.  The state 
in archaeological theory is a step in socio-cultural development.  Large populations are 
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indicative of state-level society.  They arise through the actions of elites, but are 
predicated by the societal need for centralized organization.  In cooperative models for 
the development of the state, society elevates elites to deal with specific organizational 
problems it is experiencing.  In political models, elites take advantage of historical 
circumstances to inscribe themselves at the top of society.  A decent synthesis of these 
positions would assert that conditions arise under which centralized organization and 
power are possible, and a small number of individuals act on those conditions to create a 
permanent elite.   
 
Synthesizing the Archaeological State with Social Theory 
 In the preceding discussion, I discussed many different notions about what the 
state is and how it works.  Now, the task at hand is to refine from the previous sections 
the key components of state definitions.  Combining these various components will yield 
a coherent, consistent set of requirements for confirming the presence or absence of a 
state within the Indus Civilization. 
 There are three general sets of requirements for statehood.  The first set of 
requirements is evolutionary; as many archaeologists have stated previously, states are 
the result of cultural change.  The second set is economic.  The economic requirements 
for statehood are closely related to the evolutionary requirements.  The third set is the 
most complex; ideology is a definite facet of statehood, and confirmation or denial of 
certain ideological processes is necessary not only in determining the presence or absence 
of a state, but also in understanding exactly how states work. 
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 The evolutionary requirements for statehood are very straightforward.  States do 
not simply materialize out of nowhere.  Human populations form states, and states have 
never been the first stage of human occupation in a region.  States are conglomerations of 
smaller polities, brought together as a burgeoning elite class centralizes power.  Thus, in 
order for an archaeological assemblage to indicate the presence of a state, there must be 
evidence for one or more smaller socio-political entities beneath the evidence for the state 
in question.  There must be evidence for a direct lineage between the proposed state and 
its forebears. 
 Economic requirements follow these evolutionary requirements very closely.  
Along with the evidence of smaller polities predating an alleged state, there must also be 
indications of increasing economic complexity.  The reason for this requirement is quite 
simple.  New technologies are often necessary to accommodate larger numbers of people.  
In addition, as populations begin materializing more aspects of their culture, such as 
designing new motifs to coincide with their religion and building new kinds of structures, 
they begin experimenting with new stylistic techniques.  Artifacts become more complex, 
and more numerous.  A greater number of steps are required for their production.  Many 
items require raw materials that can only be acquired from far away sources.  States build 
trade networks that extend across their territories to bring raw materials to their artisans.  
Select individuals are able to specialize in the production of just one type of artifact; not 
everyone has to participate in subsistence.  At the state level, complex artifacts are 
produced for all people in very large amount.  Many individuals, who can trace their 
power back to the ruling regime, regulate the economy itself.  Unlike a chiefdom-level 
complex economy, the state-level complex economy produces vast amounts of goods that 
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infiltrate every niche in society, rather than producing a small number of prestige goods 
for elites.  The volume of trade that occurs within a state-level economy requires the 
development of bureaucracy, individuals who represent the elite and regulate this trade.  
This kind of economic development and specialization should be visible within the 
archaeological record.  Workshops, intricate artifacts, and trade routes are all identifiable 
in the archaeological record.  A complex economy creates a demand for more steam-lined 
organization. Generally, the complex economy will coincide with territorial expansion, 
an effect way of opening up new resources for integration with a complex economy.  As 
such, states control a significantly larger region than the smaller polities they replaced. 
These economic requirements are comparative; there is no pre-defined amount of 
land a single socio-political entity must control in order to achieve statehood.  There are 
no specific technologies a civilization must develop in order to become a state.  Rather, in 
order to be a state, a polity must acquire and control a larger amount of territory than its 
forebears controlled.  It must establish trade routes and fund artisans with this territory.  
Technological development should reach new peaks.  It must be more economically 
complex than the polities it replaced. 
The final set of requirements, the ideological requisites, are the most complicated 
and most important.  According to almost every major thinker in social theory who has 
tackled the subject, states are the vehicles by which top-down ideology is maintained.  
This means many things, the foremost being that there is a civilization-wide ideology the 
state is maintaining.  Evidence for ideology, such as predominant stylistic patterns and 
evidence for ritual, should reach from the top of society towards the base.  Ideology is the 
vehicle by which the status quo is maintained.  Control, or adequate means by which the 
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ruling class can manipulate their power, is an indicator of statehood.  The specific 
methods of control, including its scale and particular strategies, provide the essence of 
states.  Evidence for social control varies greatly.  In some societies, warfare or slavery 
can be seen archaeologically.  In others, priest-kings order their people to build massive 
temples and pay tribute.  Such control strategies are evident in the archaeological record.  
In order to establish the presence of that kind of control in the archaeological record, 
there must be evidence for top-down ideological changes.  There should be evidence for 
elites.  Elites, in this case, need not be the fat cats associated with the Western perception 
of wealth.  Rather, elites are the ones who enjoy a significantly higher status than the bulk 
of the population.  They are the ones in control of society.  Elites occupy a centralized, 
elevated position in society, a perch from which they can monitor the people under their 
control.  There must be evidence for their status.  A good example of elite status would 
be stylistic motifs that emphasize individuals or people in power.  
These requirements must be taken for what they are; Western conceptions of what 
an elite should look like or what a complex economy is must be left at the door.  An elite 
is merely a central organizer who enjoys more status than her peers.  A complex economy 
merely refers to a greater number of steps and specialists than was present in the 
economy of several generations ago.  This means that even among states that perfectly 
conform to this definition, there is still a great degree of wiggle-room.  Elites need not 
always cut themselves a larger piece of pie, especially if status within their society is not 
determined by material possessions. 
 With a synthesized definition of the state established, we can now move forward 
and apply our own perception of the state to evidence from the Indus Civilization. 
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Chapter 3: The Indus Civilization 
History of Research 
 The first reports of the Indus civilization came from the sketchy writings of a 
British army deserter in the early nineteenth century (Kenoyer 1998).  Travelers in the 
Punjab region of what is now northwest India and southern Pakistan told tales of a vast 
ruined city just outside of the city limits of a town called Harappa.  The site had been 
brick-mined for centuries, and many of the buildings in modern Harappa are made of 
bricks from one of the largest cities in the Indus Civilization.  The British took notice of 
the ruins, and mined brick for the construction of the Indian railway system (Kenoyer 
1998). 
 Early archaeologists began working on the site several decades later.   The 
working hypothesis was that the ruins belonged to the ancient Mauryan Empire, at the 
time, the oldest known civilization in the region.  Several small excavations were made, 
and a site several miles to the south was discovered.  The first site became known as 
Harappa, taking its name from the modern city it was nearby, and the southern site 
became known for its name in the local language: Mohenjo Daro, or mound of the dead.   
 Work in earnest did not begin until an archaeologist named John Marshall, after 
confronting data from both sites, determined that they belonged to an as-of-yet unnamed 
civilization.  In 1924, he announced the discovery of the “Harappan” civilization to the 
world (Kenoyer 1998, McIntosh 2002).  Marshall was the first scholar to associate the 
sites together, and began writing about the Indus Civilization (Possehl 2002). 
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 Marshall did many excavations at the Harappa site.  His methods, like those used 
by his contemporaries, were primitive.  Artifacts that weren’t complete were tossed aside.  
Sherds that would, today, be used for stylistic analysis, were left on the ground at the site, 
their provenience lost.  Charcoal samples that could have been used with modern 
radiocarbon dating were ignored or thrown away.  Combined with the brick-mining 
activity, early archaeological methods compromised much of the initial data from 
Harappa and, to a lesser extent, Mohenjo Daro. 
 Regardless, Marshall was the first archaeologist to bring a defined paradigm to 
the Harappa site (Possehl 2002).  Marshall was an environmental determinist and claimed 
that the Indus Civilization was the result of the favorable climate that once persevered in 
the region.  He used data from the site to corroborate his environmental analysis.  The 
baked brick used in the houses of Harappa and Mohenjo Daro was a response to a rainy 
climate.  Street drains and complex gutter systems were required to compensate for the 
rain.  This, combined with the conspicuous lack of the lion, a dry season animal, in Indus 
iconography, according to Marshal, was evidence that the Indus Civilization was a 
response to the favorable climate in the region today (Possehl 2002).  Marshall’s analysis 
of the Indus Civilization’s socio-political structure was based largely on comparisons 
with assemblages from Mesopotamia. 
 Marshall’s paradigm became the foundation for later archaeologists’ research.  
His ideas lived on in the works of others.  However, it was not his environmental 
determinism that scholars remembered.  Along with his initial descriptions of the 
Harappan excavations, Marshall made a claim that would persist in Indus archaeology for 
many years: Harappa was home to a peaceful people who knew nothing of war and 
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conquest (Cork 2004).  He made this claim through comparison with archaeological 
assemblages from Mesopotamia and Egypt.  Other ancient civilizations are home to a ton 
of evidence that indicates violence and warfare.  Because the Indus Civilization lacked 
these indicators of violence and warfare, Marshall proposed that the Indus Civilization 
was home to a peaceful people. 
Later archaeologists began work in the Indus region with the notion that the Indus 
Civilization was an idyllic, peaceful utopia.  Working under this assumption, they did 
research projects that supported this view.  Thus, an entire tradition of archaeologists that 
described the Indus as unique and utopian cropped up.  Admittedly, this very project 
works from the perspective that the Indus Civilization is unlike other civilizations, though 
in no way does it assert that it was an idyllic utopia. Marshall’s claim established a theme 
that would survive in works all the way to the treatise written by McIntosh (2002).   
 Not every Near Eastern scholar was affected by Marshall’s initial paradigm. Some 
have worked very hard to bring a critical eye to the early works written about the 
“peaceful Harappans” (Basham 1949). 
 Sir Mortimer Wheeler of the British colonial force is another major figure from 
the initial archaeological work done in the Indus Valley.  The Indian Archaeological 
Survey did many projects before Wheeler came onto the scene.  Unfortunately, reports 
from these projects are difficult to obtain.  The poor state of site reporting and data 
preservation in the archaeology of his day inspired Wheeler to write a number of scathing 
critiques of his fellow archaeologists.  To Wheeler, an excavation that went unpublished 
was worse than no excavation at all. 
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 Wheeler was an experienced archaeologist long before he began his reformation 
and re-organization of the Indian Archaeological Survey.  He was experienced with 
Mesopotamian assemblages. Comparison with those materials guided much of his work 
in the Indus Valley.  His initial analysis of the Indus Civilization’s socio-political 
organization hinged on the idea priest-king nations, similar to those found in ancient 
Sumer.   
 Wheeler’s greatest contribution to Indus Archaeology was his careful and detailed 
work in creating and formalizing site reports.  He also began a detailed analysis of 
weapons and tools found in the Indus Valley.  Wheeler (1968) claimed that the knives 
and arrows turning up in Indus deposits were the tools of artisans, not the weapons of 
soldiers.  Indus bows and arrows would have been much more useful to the hunter than 
they would have been to the warrior.  Because Wheeler had been an important figure in 
interpreting the archaeological records of the civilizations in Mesopotamia, a group of 
very warlike and brutal polities, it is logical to assume he was competent in analyzing the 
warfare capabilities of the Indus people (McIntosh 2002). 
Wheeler confirmed Marshall’s assertion that the Indus Civilization was home to a 
peaceful people, but did so with a caveat.  Wheeler uncovered a layer in Harappa that was 
littered with bodies that had not received proper mortuary treatment.  He believed these 
bodies were the remains of massacre victims.  He went on to claim that the massacre 
marked the invasion of the Aryans, and the end of the Indus state (Wheeler 1968).  
Work in Mohenjo Daro marked an expansion of archaeological fieldwork in the 
Indus Valley.  Wheeler himself led many of the excavations in Mohenjo Daro.  Thanks to 
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his publication crusade, the quality and integrity of reports from that site are considerably 
greater than those from many other Indus sites.   
Mohenjo Daro was organized much like Harappa. Mohenjo Daro is somewhat 
younger than Harappa, but both cities share many traits (Possehl 2002).  Both were well-
planned cities with large public structures archaeologists call “citadels.”   Each is 
positioned strategically along the flow of the Indus River.  In the cities’ heyday, the 
viewshed from the upper levels of the buildings in both cities would have allowed for a 
view far down the river’s course.  The buildings were organized into integrated 
neighborhoods. Both cities cover a land area of around 100 hectares.   
Harappa and Mohenjo Daro are the largest of the Indus sites.  This led many of 
the archaeologists working during the early excavations to refer to the cities together as 
the “Twin Capitals” of the Indus Civilization. 
With the excavation of Mohenjo Daro, archaeological work on the Indus 
civilization spread into a region known as the Sindh.  Archaeologists surveyed sites up 
and down the ancient course of the Indus and Saraswati rivers.  Between 1200 and 1500 
sites have now been identified that were associated with the Indus Civilization (Kenoyer 
1998, McIntosh 2002).  The sites that archaeologists believe comprised the Indus 
civilization covered an area that doubles that of any of the Mesopotamian Civilizations or 
Ancient Egypt. 
A great many of these 1500 sites are not located along the course of the ancient 
Indus.  Rather, they drew life from the course of the ancient Saraswati (McIntosh 2002).   
A temporal bias has shaped work in this region; today, the Indus is a much more 
impressive river system than the Saraswati.  Therefore, archaeological work has 
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concentrated on sites along the Indus River.  The irony is that, during the time of the 
Indus Civilization, the Saraswati was a much more productive river (McIntosh 2002).  
The true capitals of the Indus Civilization may yet lie beneath thousands of years of 
Saraswati sediments.  Harappa, Mohenjo Daro, and the other cities of the Indus River 
may have been mere outposts of the Indus Civilization. 
Work in the Indus valley continues to this day.  While it has been several years 
since any work has been done in Mohenjo Daro or Harappa, many archaeologists are now 
focusing on outlying sites (McIntosh 2002).  One can learn only so much about a 
civilization from its capitals.  It is important to see how the dominant culture changed as 
it spread across the countryside.  Recent work has also done a very good job in 
identifying the sources of the Indus Civilization’s raw materials.  New perspectives on 
the Indus Civilization’s expansion and subsequent defense are coming out of these recent 
projects. 
The Indian Archaeological Survey retains and preserves many of the records and 
reports from excavations done in the Indus River Valley.  Indian archaeologists are 
publishing a great deal of literature about the sites.  The fall of the Indus civilization and 
its connection with the Vedas is a matter of great interest today.  A great number of 
archaeologists no longer believe that the Aryans directly encountered the Indus 
civilization as they migrated into the region many thousands of years ago.  Rather, the 
Aryan Invasion was a much slower process in which populations mingled and cultures 
merged. 
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Finding the State 
 The Indus, though central to Indian and Pakistani cultural history, has suffered 
from a lack of enthusiastic inquiry.  Because Indus sites do not produce extravagant 
artifacts like sites in Egypt and Mesopotamia, they have never caused the same kind of 
fervor (in the West particularly) as other civilizations.  This is both positive and negative.  
Sensationalism brings lots of money to archaeological sites, but excavation in such cases 
is hasty and many conclusions are reached before excavation even begins. Public-
enthused archaeology resembles treasure hunting in that only the most fantastic finds 
from sites are announced.   
Indus archaeology has been very honest since its inception.  Work in the Indus 
Valley was done in the spirit of expanding the cultural history of the region. 
Archaeologists knew they weren’t going to find golden tombs or diamond statues, so they 
focused on analyzing the materials they were finding, rather than longing for extravagant 
riches. 
 Another reason Indus archaeology is so much less prevalent than work done in 
other civilizations is that the unique historical conditions of the Indus Civilization create 
a disconnection between ancient and modern culture.  The coming of the Aryans after the 
fall of the Indus led to a massive cultural transformation in the region. Aryan-Vedic 
culture was a completely new phenomenon, and while it retained many aspects of the 
native culture it replaced, it was an entirely new entity.  The Indus Civilization fell into a 
state of vague cultural memory.  The peoples of the region do not remember the Indus 
Civilization per se; only historical vestiges such as enigmatic references in the Rig Veda 
remain in the popular cultural corpus. 
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 Another important barrier has stood in the way of Indus archaeology.  The Indus 
Civilization had a written language, but it remains un-deciphered.  The ability to read the 
Indus Script would surely change the way scholars interpret the Indus remains (Kenoyer 
1998). 
 Finally, political turbulence in the region cannot be ignored.  India and Pakistan 
have political tensions that go back to Pakistan’s formation. The Indus Civilization 
happens to be located on their disputed border.  There is, as such, a conflict of interests 
when it comes to working with and interpreting the sites. 
 In spite of these limitations, Indus archaeology is a vibrant and fruitful field of 
research.  I will now apply the state requirements discussed in Chapter 2 to the corpus of 
knowledge that has developed around the Indus Civilization.  Applying the definition to 
Indus materials will determine whether or not there was a state in the Indus River Valley, 
and answer this project’s research question. 
 The first set of requirements for statehood established in Chapter 2 pertained to 
the evolution and development of states.  States are temporal entities.  The state in 
archaeology stems from a set of historical and demographic conditions.  States develop 
from pre-existing socio-political polities.  They do not simply materialize in a vacuum.  If 
there was a state in the Indus River Valley, there must be a direct evolutionary link 
between the state in question and a proceeding collection of socio-political entities.   
 The second set of requirements for statehood is economic.  The state develops 
from the niche political economy creates in society.  Economic complexity is the 
harbinger of elites.  Elites arise because there is a purpose they can serve, and that 
purpose is organization. 
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 We must now determine whether or not the archaeological remains of the Indus 
Civilization fit these requirements.  Because change occurs over time, a narrative 
chronology, compiled from the archaeological records of Indus sites, will provide an 
impression of the Indus Civilization from which we can determine whether or not the 
evolutionary and economic requirements for statehood have been met.  In order to frame 
such a chronology, we will examine the work of Jonathan Kenoyer. 
 Kenoyer (1998) identifies a chronology of the Indus Civilization that takes much 
of the archaeological record in the region into account.  According to his chronology, 
there were four main phases in the development of the Indus Civilization.  The first of 
these phases is known as the “Early food-producing era.”  The Early Food-Producing 
phase began around 6500 B.C., and lasted 1500 years.  During this phase, the Indus 
region was home to small populations of nomads living alongside very early sedentary 
foragers.  Both groups took advantage of the natural bounty provided by the rich 
floodplains. 
The earliest culture that archaeologists have identified in the region is called the 
Mehrgarh.  The Mehrgarh was identified early on in Indus excavations (Kenoyer 1998, 
Possehl 2002, McIntosh 2002).  Remnants of Mehrgarh culture are identified by specific 
architectural and burial practices.  The people of the Mehrgarh phase lived in mud brick 
houses that, in all likelihood, had wooden roofs.  Narrow alleys and passageways 
connected the houses to one another (Kenoyer 1998).  These were probably the homes of 
the early sedentary foragers.  The earliest cultivars to be used in the Indus River Valley 
are wheat and barley (Fuller 2000).  Remains of both food types have been recovered 
from Mehrgarh levels, indicating that they were probably well on their way to developing 
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agriculture (Kenoyer 1998).  The Mehrgarh were also in possession of the earliest forms 
of technologies, such as the proto forms of lapidary, ceramics, metallurgy, and bead 
making, that dominated Indus River Valley during later eras (Kenoyer 1998, Possehl 
2002). 
During the next phase, the “Regionalization Era,” development of the region’s 
political economy began.  Regionalization took place between 5000 B.C. and 2600 B.C.  
The sedentary communities grew, and many of the technologies now associated with the 
Indus Civilization were developed.  Crafts such as pottery, metallurgy, lapidary, and seal 
making began.  Sedentary communities began growing crops to supplement their food 
supply. They began learning the flood cycles of the Indus and Saraswati Rivers. 
The Mehrgarh culture survived well into the Regionalization Era.  Possehl (2002) 
further divides the Indus chronology into many sub-phases, illustrating that the Mehrgarh 
were a cultural carry-over between the Food-Producing and Regionalization Eras.  As 
communities spread across the Indus floodplain, the peoples of the region perfected many 
of the technologies that would dominate the region.  Polities began developing, as trade 
networks for trading exotic resources for more specialized production became necessary.  
As these communities grew and became more complex, they began to form multi-
village polities.  This led to the “Integration Era.”  The Integration Era (2600 B.C.-1900 
B.C.) is characterized by the lumping together of the various communities that developed 
during the Regionalization Era.  During this era, the nomads, who had inhabited the 
region during the earliest era alongside the sedentary foragers, adopted a trading lifestyle 
(Kenoyer 1998).   The Harappan cultural phase arises during the Integration era. These 
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traders were one of the key components to the formation of the Indus Civilization.  The 
end result is a united cultural group that comprised a much more powerful entity.   
The final phase, “Localization,” was characterized by the degradation of ties 
between communities formed during the Integration era.  The Localization Era was the 
period during which the Indus Civilization collapsed. 
 The lowest levels of Harappa are associated with the Mehrgarh cultural phase.  
This means that the founders of Harappa belonged to the Mehrgarh tradition.  As the 
Integration Era dawned in the Indus River Valley, the cultural development of the region 
continued.  According to Possehl (2002), integration occurs as the Harappan site moves 
into the “Early Harappan” phase.  All around the site, sedentary communities are 
transforming into either centers of the newly established Indus Civilization, or they are 
becoming satellites, dependant on the political economy anchored in the larger cities.   
Economic complexity is reaching new heights.  A new system of craft 
organization rises to regulate the flow of goods between the cities of the Indus River 
Valley and the countryside (Kenoyer 1997).  Long distant traded routes are formed to 
bring exotic materials into the larger cities.  Lapidary and metallurgy develop into fine 
arts.  The ornaments of the integration phase are fare more intricate than those from 
previous cultural periods (Mackay 1935, McIntosh 2002).  Traders are transporting 
materials from far outside the limits of the larger cities into the economic hubs of the 
Indus Civilization.  There is a definite increase in economic complexity from the earliest 
settlements in the Indus River Valley to the height of the Indus Civilization. 
 Within the Indus River Valley, there was a clear progression from small, 
regionally organized polities into a single, large-scale, socio-political entity.  Not only do 
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settlements become larger and more developed, but also the political economy of the 
region becomes exponentially more complex than it had been.  At the Harappan site 
specifically, there is a clear cultural progression from the pre-Harappan socio-economic 
phases to the Mature Harappan phase.  This phenomenon is not limited to the Harappan 
site; it occurs all across the Indus River Valley.  The region transforms culturally, 
technologically, politically, and economically.  The Indus Civilization, therefore, meets 
all of the evolutionary and economic requirements for statehood.  The economy of the 
Indus Civilization is considerably more complex than the pre-state one it replaced, and 
the Mehrgarh culture provides the demographic precursors for a state to develop in the 
region. 
 
Ideology in the Indus Civilization 
 The ideological requirements for statehood are much harder to identify.  Ideology 
is an ephemeral cultural phenomenon.  Luckily, ideology affects people deeply, and they 
give it physical form in the material culture they create.  In order to fulfill the ideological 
requirement for statehood, it must be evident that individuals, acting alone or in concert, 
are enacting change within their society, and that change is not coming from mere 
environmental or developmental reasons. 
 As explained previously, large-scale control of ideology by a single class or 
individual must be evident in order to confirm the ideological processes inherent to 
statehood.  Marxism alleges that no elite class can ever have complete, uncontested 
control over society; some competition is always occurring.  It must be confirmed, 
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however, that the ruling class has and has used the power to enact its will upon 
individuals belonging to a lower class. 
 Were there elites in the Indus River Valley? One of the most effective ways 
archaeology has to identify elites within a society is mortuary analysis.  Archaeologists 
make several assumptions when using mortuary analysis.  Elites tend to be buried with 
material representations of the power they held during their lifetimes.  As an individual 
belonging to the ruling class approaches the end of her life, she uses her power to make 
arrangements for her funeral.  If her power persists across life states, agents that support 
her, possibly including the next generation or tier of elites, invest a great deal in her 
mortuary treatment.  Individuals of lower standing are made to invest energy in the burial 
ceremony of a fallen elite.  Often, this energy investment comes in the form of burial 
goods, objects of value that are buried or disposed of with the deceased. 
 During the Mehrgarh phase, a variety of material objects were included in flexed 
burials (Kenoyer 1998).  Some burials during this era contained a great number of grave 
goods, while others had less.  Burials tended to contain some amount of material culture.  
As the Early Harappan phase begins, the Harappans begin burying their deceased with 
fewer and fewer grave goods.  During the height of the Indus Civilization, many of the 
burials from Harappa contain only few grave goods, if any at all (Kenoyer 1998). 
 However, most graves from the Indus River Valley contained at the very least a 
little material culture.  In order to determine the secular value of buried goods, they must 
be compared to those found in a secular setting.  Thus, materials from “hoards,” or 
secular deposits of artifacts, must be considered in order to determine the value of grave 
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goods (Rissman 1988). Cultural deposits from graves are impossible to analyze if one has 
no sense of the raw value a society associates with a given material. 
 Hoards are large deposits of artifacts and materials found separately from burials.  
In Harappa, they are often located behind homes, under the floors of structures, and in 
discreet hiding places along streets (Mackay 1935).  The identification of a cultural hoard 
is often confused by the presence of “stockpiles.”  Stockpiles are caches of raw materials 
associated with a nearby workshop.  It is important not to confuse the two concepts; a 
hoard is a “personal stash,” while stockpiles are controlled by whomever controls the 
workshop.  An important distinction separating hoards from stockpiles is that individuals 
often bury hoards, whereas the environmental and cultural processes that form the site 
from which they are recovered bury stockpiles.  Of course this is not universal; 
sometimes stockpiles are buried and sometimes hoards are left in containers of various 
kinds.  The primary diagnosis of a hoard or stockpile must be determined through careful 
analysis of the site. (Rissman 1988) 
 Rissman (1988) did a comprehensive analysis of grave goods in the Indus 
Civilization.  His sample included sites from all across the Punjab and Sindh.  In order to 
control for conditional changes throughout different temporal phases, he examines only 
materials belonging to the height of the Indus Civilization.  He includes many materials 
from hoards and burials, and analyzes each with the other in mind.  Materials such as 
gold, copper, and semi-precious stones fill the hoards from various archaeological 
deposits all across the region, while simple clay ornaments and jewelry adorn the dead.  
Indeed, an entirely different spread of materials occurs in the ossuaries of the Indus 
Civilization than occurs in the hoards.  Rissman (1988) proposes that the Indus 
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Civilization had two axes of value, one secular and one spiritual.  Materials that were 
valuable spiritually had absolutely no value on the secular market, while secular goods 
were seen as worthless to the dead.  Grave goods alone seem to suggest that there were 
not elites in the Indus Civilization. 
 Another method of mortuary analysis involves diagnosing the health of 
individuals found in different graves.  The underlying assumption here is that the 
skeletons of elites will be in better health than those of commoners.  Such analysis 
reveals little difference in the health of graves believed to be the well to do of Harappa 
(burials that contain wood coffins or light jewelry) and the commoners (McIntosh 2002).  
Everyone appears to have been eating the same food, doing the same work, and living 
similar lives.  The peoples of the Indus Civilization were living very congruent lives. 
 Elite burials appear to have been absent in Harappa and Mohenjo Daro.  This, of 
course, does not mean that there were no elites in the Indus Civilization; it simply means 
that their ideas about wealth and the afterlife differ from other cultures in the 
archaeological record.  It is possible that the Indus Civilization simply did not place the 
same emphasis on the individual as other cultures.  Some scholars suggest that the Indus 
Civilization practiced a proto-caste system, similar to that of present day India (McIntosh 
2002).  In that case, the caste, not the individual, is the most important.  When an 
individual died, the caste would continue; the occurrence of death may have been largely 
meaningless. 
 One last possibility is that the Indus elites were simply treated differently in death 
than the broad populace (McIntosh 2002).  Perhaps elites were cremated in elaborate 
feasting events that did, indeed consume a great amount of energy.  Archaeologically, the 
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remains of such events would be very difficult to distinguish from regular feasting. If all 
traces of the events were burned, they may be completely invisible to archaeologists. 
 Another method archaeologists use to identify status differences within a society 
is analysis of architecture.  Individuals with many resources on hand are apt to build more 
elaborate living quarters than the rest of society.  Cities can be laid out in order to benefit 
the interests of certain groups.  Building entrances, the sizes of streets, the thickness of 
walls, and the accessibility of public works may all provide clues into the social structure 
of the society that built them.  Here we have a little more luck in identifying social 
differentiation within the Indus River Valley. 
 Indus cities were positioned in locations that afford a wide view of the 
surrounding landscape (Kenoyer 1998).  They were planned, well built, and very 
organized (Mackay 1935).  Of critical importance is the fact that large Indus cities were 
surrounding by massive earthworks (Kenoyer 1998, Mackay 1935, McIntosh 2002, 
Possehl 2002, Wheeler 1968).  Cities were clearly differentiated from the surrounding 
countryside.  This does not indicate the presence or absence of elites, but it does indicate 
that Indus Cities were designed with power over the surrounding landscape in mind. 
 In many Indus cities, sections are elevated slightly higher than other sections 
(Wheeler 1968).  Kenoyer (1998) suggests that this is one sure sign that there were elites 
living in the Indus Civilization.  Though their burials may be absent or difficult to 
identify, the elites of Harappa and Mohenjo Daro built their homes or favored 
neighborhood on higher platforms than the common people. 
 Neighborhoods in the great cities of the Indus Civilization were discrete entities.  
A single neighborhood was separated from the rest of the city via rows of smaller houses  
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Figure II: Building layout of Mohenjo-Daro that illustrates the scattering of large structure.  Some scholars 
suggest that housing clusters around larger buildings comprise neighborhoods.  From Wheeler 1968:48 
 
and wider streets (Kenoyer 1998).  Neighborhoods consisted of many different sized 
structures, all-interlocking to form one cohesive unit.  Smaller houses formed the 
peripheries of neighborhoods.  They were connected via street-level passages and 
possibly wooden rooftops to medium-sized houses that formed the rows that outlined the 
centers of neighborhoods (Mackay 1935).  Large structures that many scholars believe 
were houses were found in the interior of neighborhoods.  If discrete family groups lived 
in each of these large houses, then the urban landscape of the Indus Civilization consisted 
of many districts, each controlled by its own group of elites.  Elites, therefore, would not 
have lived together, as the raised platforms in some parts of the Indus Cities suggest; 
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rather, they would have lived among the commoners, proximal to the people directly 
under their control.  On the other hand, these structures may not be residential. 
 Public works are the final trait of Indus Civilization architecture this project will 
take into account.  Large “citadel” mounds have been discovered in almost every large 
Indus city (Kenoyer 1998, Mackay 1935, Possehl 2002, Wheeler 1968).  The exact 
purpose of these structures is unknown.  Some have suggested that they were palaces, but 
very few items of substantial secular wealth have been recovered from these sites 
(Rissman 1988).  They could be organizational centers, used by the top members of each 
of the elite groups that run the various neighborhoods in Indus Cities.  They could also be 
defensive works a last line of defense should the city come under siege (Wheeler 1968).  
This, of course, seems unlikely, for evidence of warfare is scattered and scant in the Indus 
Civilization. 
 These sites are generally located alongside or at least associated with other large 
public works structures.  In Mohenjo Daro, a huge structure now believed to be public 
baths stands slightly offset from the rest of the city (Possehl 2002).  Ritual bathing is also 
associated with Hinduism and could corroborate McIntosh’s (2002) assertion that social 
structure in the Indus Civilization was predicated by a caste system.  Another public 
building associated with the large Indus Cities is the “granary” in Harappa, identified by 
Wheeler (1968) in one of his many exploration digs at the site.  The granary is located 
near the citadel, seeming to indicate some degree of organizational importance at the 
citadel. 
 Where there elites in the Indus Civilization?  Though burials are absent, and 
secular wealth seems to be somewhat evenly distributed, there is a fair amount of 
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evidence for the great organizational power of a select group of individuals within the 
Indus Civilization.  The cities themselves are positioned strategically, taking advantage of 
the potential power over the surrounding landscape a location has to over.  Though public 
buildings and centers are evident in the archaeological record of the region, access to 
them is difficult to identify.  Houses in the Indus River Valley are different from one 
another; some are large and some are small.  Based upon this evidence, it is likely that 
there was some kind of high-status individuals acting as organizers in the Indus 
Civilization.  It is difficult to discern what kinds of rewards they were getting for their 
efforts; they appear to be in the same state of physical health and well being as the 
commoner in the Indus River Valley.  Can we call these individuals elites?  They did 
occupy the highest status positions within Indus society, and they did hold organizational 
power over their peers.  But did they organize Indus Civilizations?  In order to call these 
individuals organizers, we must determine whether or not they were truly in control of 
the Indus Civilization.  This brings us to the next phase of this project: identifying control 
in the Indus Civilization.  
 There is definitive evidence for control in the Indus Civilization.  The first and 
most apparent manifestation of control is the Indus Seals, components of the enigmatic 
writing system used by the peoples of the Indus River Valley.  These small, steatite 
squares carry many different motifs, some purely symbolic and some pictographic.  They 
depict many different things.  The most common Indus symbol is a shape similar to a fish 
(Robinson 2002).  Cows and bulls are the second most common theme for seals (Mackay 
1935).  Of great interest is a common seal that depicts a seated figure with many arms.  
Mackay (1935) thinks that this seal represents a super-natural entity that would evolve  
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Figure III: The most common symbol on Indus seals.  Some scholars believe it represents a fish.  Others 
believe it represents a chiefly individual.  Modified from Robinson 2002:273 
 
and change throughout the cultural evolution of the region to become Shiva, the Hindu 
god of creation and destruction. 
 The ideological importance of the Indus Seals comes not only from the symbols 
they carry, but also from the materials from which they were made (McIntosh 2002, 
Kenoyer 1998).  Indus seals of many different materials have been recovered from the 
streets of Harappa and Mohenjo Daro.  Some seals are made of high-quality steatite, 
while others are made of clay (Mackay 1935).  It is feasible to think that some may even 
have been made of wood.  Seals may have been worn as ornaments (Kenoyer 1998). 
 The difference in material composition and manufacture of Indus seals may have 
been the most important divide between the elites and commoners of the Indus 
Civilization (Kenoyer 1998, McIntosh 2002).  Everyone in the Indus River Valley may 
have had access to materials for making axes, but some individuals had axes made of 
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much nicer materials than other individuals (McIntosh 2002).  There is some possible 
evidence for ideological control along these lines.  Archaeologists have found Indus seals 
manufactured of many different kinds of materials.  Seals made out of some materials are 
found in much smaller quantities.  This means that not everyone in the Indus Civilization 
possessed seals of the same material.  Perhaps elites wore seals of exotic materials, while 
commoners emulated these seals with clay or less expensive materials (Kenoyer 1998).  
In such a case, commoners would unwittingly reproduce elite ideology through emulation 
of their seals.. 
 Another artifact supports this perspective on the control of ideology in the Indus 
Civilization.  Bangles, circular ornaments worn by the peoples of the Indus Civilization, 
were made of many different materials and carried many different symbols (Mackay 
1935).  Copious amounts of script have come out of sites believed to be the workshops of 
artisans who specialized in the production of these ornaments (McIntosh 2002).  There 
seems to have been a great deal of concern for the exact process by which these bangles 
were produced.  McIntosh (2002) believes that there were few of a specific kind of 
bangles being produced.  Only a few individuals would have been able to consume these 
bangles.  Assuming the script associated with these workshops was about bangle 
manufacture, such a copious amount may be indicative of elites trying to control their 
production. 
 There were other societal functions that would have most assuredly fallen under 
the control of elites.  An important indictor of elite control in any archaeological 
assemblage is warfare.  Warfare is associated with the rise and establishment of elites in 
every known society in the world.  Warfare is a form of social control that not only 
54 
 
 
expands the power of elites, it forfeits and devalues the peoples below the elites who are 
dying to enforce the elites’ will. 
 Of course, warfare is almost completely absent in the Indus Civilization.  Though 
some violence most likely did exist (Wheeler 1968, Cork 2005), it was not on the scale 
that can be found in other civilizations.  While some violence may have occurred in Indus 
cities, it was small-scale and likely between individuals wielding tools as weapons.  This 
suggests that if warfare in fact occurred, it was internal and resistive.  The Indus 
Civilization’s economy was not concentrating on churning out weapons and warriors, 
indicating that violence arising in the region would be likely be small-scale.  If there was 
a state in the Indus River Valley, it did not wage military campaigns or concern itself 
with territorial dominance.  Artifacts designed specifically for the killing of other humans 
are almost completely absent in the archaeological record of the Indus Civilization. 
 One final method of social control that may have been used in the Indus 
Civilization is trade regulation.  As mentioned earlier, a complex set of weights and 
measures has been recovered from all of the great cities of the Indus Civilization 
(Kenoyer 1998, McIntosh 2002, Possehl 2002).  These weights and measures are 
standard across all Indus cities.  They take the form of tiny clay cubes and spheres.  The 
standard weight is about 13.7 grams (McIntosh 2002, Possehl 2002).  From that size they 
double in size, or shrink by half.  The smallest increment is 1/16 the size of the original 
unit. 
 Scholars often assumed that traders used these weights to expedite economic 
activity.  Kenoyer (1998) has a different theory.  His work shows that there were not 
nearly enough complete sets of the weights for every Indus trader to have been using 
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them.  Rather, there were relatively few sets of weights concentrated at points in the city 
that would have been important for maintaining bureaucratic control.  The largest 
concentrations of weights in Harappa were found at gates.  Because these weights and 
measures would have been in the hands of a select few, it is likely that these highly 
standardized and official weights and measures were used not as everyday bartering 
tools, but as devices for maintaining control over the economy.  Elites might have been 
taxing trade coming into Indus cities with their weights and measures (Kenoyer 1998).  It 
is wholly possible that Indus elites were using these standardized weights and measures 
to control the Indus economy. 
 Based on the above section, the Indus Civilization does, in fact, meet the 
ideological requirements for statehood.  Elites, though elusive and challenging to detect 
archaeologically, do exist.  They lived in larger houses than the rest of the populace, and 
probably wore ornaments made of rare materials.  The seals, while serving as a system of 
writing and communication, may have also been used as symbols of the elites.  They 
exerted power over the economy through strategic city placement, control of public 
structures, and through control over the economies of the Indus cities.  It is difficult to 
determine the reasons elites would want to control the Indus Civilization.  They do not 
appear to have been gaining vast hoards of material wealth.  They do not appear to have 
been healthier than the common populace.  Were they controlling Indus life so that they 
could live in slightly larger houses?  Perhaps there were less tangible benefits to serving 
in an elite capacity in the Indus Civilization, such as permanent status for one’s offspring 
or access to the monumental baths or citadel. 
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Chapter 4: Conclusion 
 There are a number of factors that hinder this analysis of the Indus Civilization.  
The region where the Indus Civilization once stood is very temperate.  Wet seasons and 
cold seasons alternate throughout the year.  This makes archaeological preservation very 
sketchy.  As described at length by Mackay (1935), the Indus River Valley was harsh to 
the brick buildings that once comprised the Indus cities.  Mud filled in the spaces around 
the bricks that lined the walls of Harappan structures.  Excavating mud from brick is 
difficult no matter what time period one is working in.  Also, salt leached from these 
bricks, melding them together and making structural interpretation difficult.  Additionally 
the changes in the course of rivers throughout the region scarred the Indus ruins.  
Preservation in the region is poor, and any conclusions about the people who once lived 
there must take it into account.   
 Archaeological work done during the earliest phase of Indus excavations was very 
primitive.  Like all archaeological projects pursued during the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, the excavations at Harappa and Mohenjo Daro were crude.  Early 
archaeologists were more interested in finding artifacts and confirming historical 
accounts than building a chronology for the Indus Civilization. 
 The Saraswati region, though heavily surveyed, needs to receive more attention.  
A great many sites are clustered along its ancient course, some of which may be as larger 
or larger than Harappa or Mohenjo Daro.  The true capital of the Indus Civilization may 
yet be under the soil (McIntosh 2002). 
 Because relatively few archaeologists have tackled the mysteries of the Indus 
Civilization, dominant paradigms such as John Marshall’s “peaceful Harappan” 
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perspective have had a profound impact on archaeological work.  Archaeologists began 
working under the assumption that the Indus Civilization was peaceful, leading them to 
find only evidence that supports the model and limiting evidence to the contrary.  Most of 
the data analyzed in this project reflects this paradigm.  Though I attempted to find 
perspectives that refute or at least acknowledge this bias, it should come as no surprise 
that this work reflects this paradigm. 
 The Indus script stands as an important obstacle to interpreting Indus 
assemblages.  Cracking the Indus code would add an entirely new depth of knowledge to 
archaeological analyses.  The historical record for the Indian subcontinent would extend 
back another several thousand years.  Perhaps we could finally determine who the elites 
were in the Indus Civilization, and understand how they operated. 
 Despite these notable hindrances to understanding the Indus Civilization, this 
project has satisfactorily determined several things.  There was a state in the Indus 
Civilization.  The evolutionary requirements for statehood are clearly met.  The Indus 
Civilization is the culmination of a cultural tradition that dates back to 6500 BC.  Polities 
that long subsisted on the bounty of the floodplains joined together to form the first large-
scale socio-political entity in the region.  The economy became much more complex, and 
trade networks brought resources to the mighty centers of Indus power.  Elites, though 
they may be hard to find, were definitely present.  They expressed their status via larger 
houses and intricate ornaments (Kenoyer 1998, Mackay 1935, McIntosh 2002).  Control 
is everywhere in the Indus Civilization.  From weights and measures in the gatehouses to 
the strict organization by which Indus cities were laid out, the elites controlled trade and 
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society strictly.  Though they appear to have been benevolent trade leaders, and not 
rapacious dictators, elites were definitely organizing the Indus Civilization. 
 The Indus Civilization teaches us about the potential flexibility of the state.  The 
state need not be a vehicle for oppression, and the organizers of society need not be 
greedy individualists.  It is not human nature to be capitalist survivalists.  The Indus state 
achieved statehood without resorting to large-scale violence and warfare.  The Indus 
people reaped the benefits of trade and group labor without dealing with unpleasant 
consequences like warfare and oppression 
 Of course, how the Indus people managed to create this kind of society, how they 
dodged the metaphorical bullet of differentiated society, is a whole other question, and 
requires a much more detailed examination of the origins of the Indus state and the Indus 
elite.  That is a matter of future research.  The Indus Civilization has much still to tell us 
about human nature and the potentials of socio-political organization. 
 
What’s Next? 
 There are, of course, many more questions to be answered about the Indus 
Civilizations.  Future research should take into account the hindrances I noted in the 
conclusions of this project.  Additionally, there are a couple more suggestions I would 
like to make for the future of Indus archaeology.   
A better synthesis of research done by Indian, Pakistani, and other archaeologists 
is necessary.  The sites themselves are part of the direct cultural patrimony of the 
inhabitants of the Punjab and Sindh, and should forever be under their charge.  However, 
the information coming from the sites is crucial to the understanding of human political 
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organization as a whole.  Any scholar writing about the state or differentiation needs to 
take into account the evidence from the Indus River Valley. 
 I also encourage more research on the sites themselves.  As mentioned several 
times in this paper, the Saraswati is home to thousands of sites that have barely been 
studied.  Information from these sites could redefine how we think about the Indus 
Civilization.  Luckily, interest in the religious connection between the Indus Civilization 
and the origins of Hinduism is now driving further research in the region.  The 
connection between the Indus sites and the Vedas has inspired a great deal of work 
pertaining to the collapse of the Indus Civilization. 
 Finally, scholars should redouble their efforts at breaking the Indus code.  Though 
we cannot be sure, it is likely that their written documents contain a great deal of 
information about Indus life.  Unfortunately, we are unable to read them.  Establishing a 
historical record alongside the archaeological record would easily double what we know 
about the Indus Civilization.  No other discovery could yield as much information about 
the Indus way of life. 
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